Episode summary
Scott Horton joins Julian Dorey for a wide-ranging discussion of the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion and the political use of 9/11 in selling it to the US public. Horton argues neoconservative networks inside government and sympathetic media helped drive the war, alleging that the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans bypassed standard intelligence review, leaned on claims from Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, and pushed material directly to the vice-president’s office and journalists.
Dorey presses on whether oil was a central motive; Horton disputes that major US oil companies “drove” the war and instead frames Israel’s security concerns and neoconservative strategy documents as pivotal. Horton quotes what he attributes to former US official Philip Zelikow, suggesting Iraq’s core “threat” was to Israel and that this rationale was not made explicit publicly.
The conversation turns to 9/11 intelligence failures. Horton recounts the Zacarias Moussaoui case, claiming FBI headquarters blocked a FISA warrant sought by the Minneapolis office and arguing earlier access might have disrupted the plot. He also states he believes US forces allowed Osama bin Laden to escape at Tora Bora, alleging a political incentive to sustain a broader war narrative.
In the final section, Horton disputes a World War II analogy raised by Dorey, claiming US policy deliberately provoked Japan into attacking at Pearl Harbor, citing the McCollum memo as presented by author Robert Stinnett, and arguing that Britain and the US made strategic choices that had long-term consequences for the Cold War order.
